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In this Essay, I argue that the World Health Organization (WHO) has not been equipped
with the necessary authority to adequately fulfill its mission. The WHO was built on the mis-
taken assumption that attaining adequate global health is a matter of high-level coordination.
However, the challenge of global health governance is, crucially, also one of complex political
cooperation. I distinguish between different types of cooperation problems faced by the
WHO and explain why achieving global health calls for intrusive powers by a governing
authority—powers that the WHO does not enjoy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The criticisms leveled at the World Health Organization (WHO) since the onset of the
COVID-19 global pandemic in early 2020 are fundamentally misguided. Admittedly, the
organization reacted slowly to information about an outbreak of coronavirus in China, and
offered imprudent advice—exhorting states to avoid travel bans, even after China had
imposed a lockdown in Wuhan.1 But these errors of judgment betray a more fundamental
flaw: the very design of the WHO is not fit for the challenges it faces. The organization was
designed on an assumption that the improvement of global health was the shared goal of all
nations and that fighting disease was an effort to which all are committed.
Given this assumption, the underlying premise of the visionaries behind the WHO was that
the primary challenge in the pursuit of global health was a matter of expert coordination. A coor-
dination problem requires a collective decision on which course to take, which expert theory to
follow, or which standard to adopt. Once agreed, everybody shares the incentive to follow that
standard. Hence, the founding fathers of the WHO Constitution perceived it as a body that
could represent humanity by taking a science-based approach—one that transcended politics.2
*Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, CCNg Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge,
Visiting Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
1 Wuhan Lockdown “Unprecedented,” Shows Commitment to Contain Virus: WHO Representative in China,
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2020), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-who-idUSKBN1ZM1G9. The
WHO’s updated advice did not include restrictions on international traffic. WHO, Updated WHO Advice
For International Traffic in Relation to the Outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus 2019-nCoV, (Jan. 24, 2020),
at https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-advice-for-international-traffic-in-relation-to-
the-outbreak-of-the-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-24-jan.
2 See notes 8, 24–25 and accompanying text infra.
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But the COVID-19 pandemic has vividly demonstrated that the underlying challenge of
improving global health is not one of poor coordination among scientists, nor even one of
lack of scientific cooperation, but a lack of political cooperation. The WHO’s efforts to
combat the pandemic have been plagued by competing economic, political, and social
demands—conflicts that render coordination difficult and cooperation impossible.3 As in
other global-scale cooperation problems—such as climate change—even if everybody
knows what needs to be done, at least some have the incentive to “cheat.” Fighting pandemics
poses collective risks to human society, but some are more vulnerable than others, and the
associated costs—of prevention and treatment, for instance—are not shared equally.
Seeking to protect their citizens, states are primed to take defensive action, such as underre-
porting outbreaks or closing their borders preemptively.4 At the same time there are also
domestic conflicts of interest, as powerful lobbies weigh in to steer national and global health
policies in their favor.5
This Essay analyzes the type of challenges that global health management poses and
demonstrates that the WHO was not designed to wield the tools necessary to meet them.
To substantiate this claim, I offer a typology of international organizations (IOs), distinguish-
ing between the two fundamental types of challenge they address: coordination and cooper-
ation (Part II). I explain why each of these two challenges requires distinct organizational
tools, and then apply these insights to the challenges posed by global health management.
In Part III, I examine the design of the WHO and argue that it was never conceived to fulfill
the crucial role of ensuring international political cooperation. The opportunity to endow it
with tools to effectively manage pandemics, was passed on in 2005 during the drafting of the
International Health Regulations (IHR). As a result of the limited authority granted by the
IHR, the WHO is unable to effectively respond to pandemics. Part IV concludes.
II. GLOBAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT: BETWEEN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
A. Coordination and Cooperation Distinguished
IOs seek to resolve complex issues situated between two poles: coordination problems and
cooperation problems.6 Coordination problems reflect the need to agree on certain rules, such
as whichmetrics to use or what language to speak.While parties may have diverse preferences,
they share the interest of searching for a common rule. Therefore, coordination problems,
while potentially contentious about the contents of the rules, tend not to require monitoring
and enforcement of the rules once they are adopted.
3 On the distinction between coordination and cooperation, see Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
4 Patrick Zylberman, Civilizing the State: Borders, Weak States and International Health in Modern Europe, in
MEDICINE AT THE BORDER: DISEASE, GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY (Alison Bashford ed., 2007); ALISON BASHFORD,
IMPERIAL HYGIENE: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH 115–36 (2004) (on
disease as a motivation for states to enhance control of borders).
5 Rob Davis & Jasper Jolly, Aviation Bosses Raise “Serious Concern”Over UK Quarantine Plans, GUARDIAN (May
11, 2020), at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/11/heathrow-calls-for-urgent-plan-to-restart-
more-flights.
6 On these two problems as two “polar” situations. See Snidal, supra note 3, at 937.
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The drafters of the WHO Constitution saw its task as managing global coordination to
eradicate disease. Hence, they designed an institution that would promote knowledge
about diseases and how to avoid them, through a set of rules based on medical expertise.7
In this foundational model, politics are sidelined.
But global health management presents not only technical coordination problems but also
requires political cooperation. Cooperation problems are usually mired by the fact that
despite common goals, it is strategically advantageous for every actor to “cheat.” A state
may be minded to pollute a shared lake while others treat their sewage, to subsidize its
own industries while others open freely welcome imports, and so on. Hence, to facilitate
cooperation, it is not enough to set the rules. Instead, it is crucial to set up enforcement mech-
anisms to ensure compliance.
The management of global health poses both types of problem. Health is a coordination
game, because actors need to know what the health risks are and the correct ways to treat the
disease in question. A global body can reduce health risks by identifying pathogens and dis-
seminating information about the most effective ways to remedy them. It can also resolve
coordination problems for those active within states,8 e.g., by providing useful information
to civil society activists seeking to curb the inordinate political power of lobbies such as
tobacco companies, or big pharma companies.9
But global health also poses a set of interstate cooperation problems, as states have different
capabilities and vulnerabilities that shape their responses to health risks. These differences
create externalities, as one state can impose risks on another: often, states conceal outbreaks
to avoid becoming “the target of other states’ costly [trade] barriers.”10 Furthermore, scarcity
problems plague the attainment of global health goals particularly in times of pandemics as
states may hoard medical equipment, profiteer off in-demand resources, and limit their
export. As much as nations want other nations to get rid of their illicit weapons while clan-
destinely keeping stocks of their own, some states would wish their neighbors to eradicate
domestic causes of diseases while they keep pushing their farmers to clear forests and get
even closer to virus-bearing animals.
B. Global Health Poses a Complex Set of Cooperation Problems
In the context of global health, there are specific factors that shape states’ incentive to coop-
erate at all. The extant literature on global cooperation emphasizes the following as being
influential: the number of participants (whether a bilateral or multiparty game); their expec-
tation that they will repeat their engagement indefinitely; and the quality of the information
7 MARCOS CUETO, THEODORE M. BROWN & ELIZABETH FEE, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: A HISTORY
32–33, 39–40 (2019); David Macfadyen, The Genealogy of WHO and UNICEF and the Intersecting Careers of
Melville Mackenzie (1889–1972) and Ludwik Rajchman (1881–1965) (Sept. 2014) (unpublished M.D. disser-
tation, Glasgow University), at http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5625.
8 BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 125–48
(2012).
9 Tatiana Andia &Nitsan Chorev,Making Knowledge Legitimate: Transnational Advocacy Networks’ Campaigns
Against Tobacco, Infant Formula And Pharmaceuticals, 17 GLOB. NETWORKS 255 (2017).
10 Catherine Z. Worsnop, Concealing Disease: Trade and Travel Barriers and the Timeliness of Outbreak
Reporting, 20 INT’L STUD. PERSPEC. 344, 345 (2019).
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they have about the performance of their partners.11 Mancur Olson also emphasized relative
power within communities as a factor that can encourage or hinder the possibility of over-
coming collective action problems, as even just a few out of several actors—provided they are
sufficiently powerful—could unilaterally bear the collective burden of obtaining the public
good.12 This literature has been invoked by international relations theorists to explain the
benefits of IOs and to indicate which tools they should be equipped with to ensure their
effectiveness.13
Beyond the number of parties, the information to which they have access, and their relative
capabilities, there are additional antecedent factors that help predict successful cooperation:
(1) scope (whether single-issue or multi-issue); (2) frequency of iterations; and (3) relative
vulnerability of the parties. As I briefly outline here, in the context of global health, these
factors predict enormous challenges for cooperation.
(1) Scope: Single-issue cooperation involves one shared challenge that poses a collective
action problem, such as the management of a specific stock of fish (e.g., Bluefin tuna14 or
whales15) or weapons (anti-personnel landmines16 or chemical weapons17), as opposed to
topics that interface with several other aspects of human activity (such as freshwater, which
impacts demand on land, economic development, human rights, tourism, and so on). Elinor
Ostrom has shown that a single issue to which only a few parties have access (e.g., certain
fisheries or oil) can yield robust cooperation between them.18
(2) Frequency: Since an iteration of exchanges that runs indefinitely is key to the evolution
of cooperation, frequently iterated exchanges, such as during the 1916 trench warfare, are
likely to yield stable cooperation, even spontaneously. But when the iterations are intermit-
tent and infrequent, cooperation is less stable and actors must find ways for parties to signal
their continuous commitment.
(3) Relative vulnerability: Equal vulnerability occurs in situations of perfect reciprocity,
when all parties can effect an outcome or benefit or suffer from it equally, such as fighters
in their trenches or riparian states sharing a lake. In contrast, in situations of unequal vulner-
ability, such as with respect to climate change, the inclination to cooperate will differ. Parties
locked in a situation of relative vulnerability might succeed in identifying other areas where
they have opposing vulnerabilities (such as pollution and transport along a shared river) and
11 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982);
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF
COOPERATION (1987).
12 MANCUR OLSON, A THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
13 E.g., Robert O. Kehoane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379 (1988); Helen
Milner, International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, 44 WORLD POL. 466
(1992); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1998).
14 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993, 1819 UNTS 359.
15 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 UNTS 72.
16 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 UNTS 211.
17 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of ChemicalWeapons
and on Their Destruction, Sept. 3, 1992, 1975 UNTS 45.
18 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990).
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thereby “enhance or create a zone of possible agreement,”19 but at the cost of increasing the
complexity and interrelatedness of the issues the IO is required to address.
The greater the extent to which an issue is single-faceted, elicits frequent indefinite itera-
tions, and generates equal vulnerability among parties, the easier it is to ensure cooperation,
perhaps through the simple promise of reciprocity and without the need for a global institu-
tion to ensure compliance. The more multifaceted, infrequent, and reflective of unequal vul-
nerabilities the issue is, the more challenging cooperation becomes. Global health
management offers one of the more challenging cooperation problems along all these axes.
A very large number of states face multiple forces at play (economic, social, cultural, and
other considerations beyond the medical). The interaction, while indefinite, is infrequent
because the rate of pandemics is rather low.20 Finally, states’ vulnerabilities differ fundamen-
tally: since the nineteenth century, most pathogens have originated in a few developing coun-
tries that externalized the risk on others, while the rest would close their borders, even
preemptively, harming their trade partners in turn. These “upstream–downstream” relations
have since becomemore complex, with states that are both sources of pathogens and exporters
on which other states depend, and others who are “super-spreaders,” given their dense eco-
nomic networks. States also differ in their ability to adapt to health risks or their willingness to
tolerate such risks.
This brief survey shows that IOs charged with managing global health must have the tools
to overcome the most complex cooperation problems among mutually distrustful sovereigns.
They must have independent and impartial global regulators with access to independent
sources of information that they can share with all states. They must have norms and systems
via which to share the burdens and benefits of global health goods, coupled with mechanisms
to increase the frequency of iterations and to monitor and enforce compliance with such
norms. Part III shows that the WHO was never designed to have these resources.
III. THE WHO: BETWEEN EXPERTISE AND POLITICS
A. The Promise of Expertise
Among the WHO’s functions are “to assist Governments, upon request, in strengthening
health services; . . . [and] to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, nec-
essary aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments . . . .”21 Its personnel are mainly
technicians, “chosen from among persons most qualified by their technical competence in the
field of health.”22 The scientific–technical aspect of the organization is also reflected in the
authority of the World Health Assembly (the WHO’s policy-setting body) to issue norms
19 James K. Sebenius,Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 37 INT’L ORG. 281, 314
(1983); Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 13.
20 Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President,Mitigating the Impact of Pandemic Influenza
Through Vaccine Innovation (Sept. 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/
09/Mitigating-the-Impact-of-Pandemic-Influenza-through-Vaccine-Innovation.pdf (the U.S. Council estimated
“a 4 percent annual probability of pandemic influenza”).
21 Constitution of the World Health Organization (1948), Arts. 1 & 2.
22 Id. Art. 11.
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through a two-thirds majority of members acting and voting, binding all states parties without
ratification unless they formally opt out.23
There is an optimistic premise here that, once expert science directs the way, all will follow
its lead and adopt whatever measures the WHO deems necessary. The WHO was thus
designed to respond only to the coordination of global health problems. Under this paradigm,
there is no space for politics, and governments should simply be willing to cede authority for
the global body to act without pre-approval.24 It is for this reason that monitoring and
enforcement tools are entirely absent from the WHO’s repertoire.
For the industrialized West, such a body was probably deemed nonconstraining when it
was created in the late 1940s. Although a multilateral body, this posed no concern for the
United States and its allies. As one of its visionaries stated, “one could simply not expect
the Great Powers to be overruled by a vote of less developed nations.”25 Science was seen
as consonant withWestern preferences;26 theWHOwas expected to primarily address health
standards in developing countries;27 and, as a U.S.-dominated body, it served (or domesti-
cally presented as serving) Western efforts to demonstrate their commitment to the global
poor against Soviet intentions.28 The regulation of the possible (Western) responses to pan-
demics through trade and travel bans—which previously acted as the prime motivation for
global health regimes29—was diverted to the newly formed General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (which acknowledged the right to balance trade against the protection of
human life).30More profoundly, theWHO ensured the free flow of information from poorer
countries (the source of the pathogens) to alert the West, which would respond by imposing
costly trade and travel restrictions on the source state and developing vaccines that would be
prohibitive for the South.31 TheWHO, in this regard, served as a useful warning alarm to the
rich states parties without committing them to share the risks and burdens of pandemics.
Nevertheless, developing countries embraced the new body, and, indeed, Brazil and China
23 Armin von Bogdandy& Pedro Villareal, International Law on Pandemic Response: A First Stocktaking in Light
of the Coronavirus Crisis (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law, Research Paper
No. 2020-07, March 26, 2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3561650.
24 According to the WHO Constitution, supra note 21, Art. 28(i), the Executive Board has authority “to take
emergency measures within the functions and financial resources of the Organization to deal with events requiring
immediate action.”
25 Macfadyen, supra note 7, at 223.
26 Melville D. Mackenzie, Today’s Global Frontiers in Public Health, 35 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 100, 104 (1945)
(“In practice it is impossible to expect more developed countries to be overruled by the votes of nations less devel-
oped from a medical and social point of view.”). Elizabeth Fee, Marcu Cueto & Theodore M. Brown, At the Roots
of the World Health Organization’s Challenges: Politics and Regionalization, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1912 (2016)
(in the early years, Europeans constituted the majority of the WHO staff, while the recruitment of a few medical
experts from developing countries “was criticized for depleting precarious health systems of valuable individuals”).
27 Mackenzie, supra note 26, at 104–05.
28 Fee, Cueto&Brown, supra note 26 (citing U.S. politicians linking national security and the worldwide strug-
gle against disease and poverty: “Disease and poverty must be fought [because they] ‘feed communism’”).
29 Valeska Huber, The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera,
1851–1894, 49 HIST. J. 453, 456, 471 (2006).
30 David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New International
Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 325, 336–37 (2005).
31 Until Indonesia demurred in 2006, leading to an arrangement with limited results. SeeMichelle F. Rourke,
Access by Design, Benefits if Convenient: A Closer Look at the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework’s Standard
Material Transfer Agreements, 97 MILBANK Q. 91 (2019); Mark Eccleston-Turner, The Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework: A Viable Procurement Option for Developing States?, 17 MED. L. INT’L 227 (2017).
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tabled in 1945 the proposal for setting up an international health organization,32 because they
saw it as their key to modernity.33 Perhaps it was this meeting of different interests that
obscured the fact that global health management is something more complex than an apolit-
ical coordination effort.
COVID-19 is not the first time that this vision was put to the test. Among earlier cases there
is one that stands out—the SARS outbreak in 2002–2003—because it remains a marker of
success for what theWHO can achieve when it expands its authority. It is to this case that we
now turn.
B. Activism During the SARS Pandemic: Functionalism Gone Ultra Vires?
There was a rare moment in the life of the WHO when it sought to promote global coop-
eration. It was when the WHO responded swiftly and effectively in response to the SARS
outbreak, it demonstrated what an independent, resourceful global body can achieve.34
The aftermath also showed the implications for states that prefer short-term gains and
have no faith in the WHO. The organization was directed by a seasoned politician (Gro
Harlem Brundtland, formerly Norway’s prime minister) and by resourceful and committed
medical experts operating in China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. In a matter of weeks, over-
coming lack of cooperation and even resistance by governments, the WHO obtained inde-
pendent information and acted on it by issuing public advisories and drafting teams of experts
into countries to ensure that they were following effective policies. It issued a global alert with
recommendations and travel advisories.35 It resorted to public shaming of China and even
issued an ultimatum to elicit its cooperation.36 The Washington Post aptly likened the
WHO to “the natural if unelected leader of a crowded lifeboat, [that] gave orders that no
one wanted to be the first to disobey.”37
Was the WHO acting within its powers? The general jurisprudence concerning powers of
IOs, which celebrates “functionalism,” would probably be supportive of such permissive
interpretations of IO powers as “essential to the performance of [their] duties.”38 But at
32 CUETO, BROWN & FEE, supra note 7, at 37–38.
33 See SUNIL AMRITH, DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL HEALTH: INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1930–65, at 159
(2006); Randall M. Packard, Civilizing the State: Borders, Weak States and International Health in Modern
Europe, in INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 94, 96 (Roger Cooter & John Pickstone
eds., 1998).
34 This was not the only case of effective intervention. During 2003 it also publicly criticized Indonesia
for refusing to cull flocks of infected birds, and the pressure led to compliance. MARK W. ZACHER &
TANIA J. KEEFE, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: UNITED BY CONTAGION 60 (2008).
35 When Toronto was included in a Travel Advisory, on April 23, 2003, the Canadian government demurred
and “following political representations at the highest level,” Toronto was dropped six days later. Id. at 61.
36 For the reaction of the WHO to the SARS pandemic, see DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (2004). See also SARA E. DAVIES, ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT & SIMON RUSHTON, DISEASE
DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 43–73 (2015).
37 David Brown, The SARS Triumph, and What It Promises, WASH. POST (July 20, 2003), at https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/07/20/the-sars-triumph-and-what-it-promises/b17713be-2ced-4963-
8db2-f5fb46f3956b.
38 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174,
183 (Apr. 11). SeeAdamKamradt-Scott,The EvolvingWHO: Implications for Global Health Security, 6 GLOB. PUB.
HEALTH 801 (2011) (suggesting that WHO actions might have been covered by implied emergency powers for it
to take all measures necessary to avert an impending global health threat). On functionalism generally, see Jan
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the time, even supporters of theWHO leadership noted that it acted beyond its mandate and
“without deference to the sovereignty of affected states.”39
C. Reasserting Sovereignty: The IHR (2005)
Initially, most member states were supportive of how the WHO had handled the SARS
pandemic. However, a year later, when debating major revisions to the IHR (to extend the
scope of the 1969 Regulations and develop a new legal framework for them), “governments
had collectively agreed to impose new restrictions on the Director-General’s autonomy.”40
This agreement reflected their inability to overcome a fundamental, intractable conflict:
developed states wanted the WHO to have greater access to non-state-based information
about impending health risks but limited authority to censure their protective measures;
while developing countries insisted that the WHO remain dependent on information only
they would provide, and demanded more accountability from states blocking trade.41 The
outcome was an agreement to “reify member states’ sovereignty.”42
The revised IHR thereby undercut the WHO’s authority to offer a swift and resolute
response to outbreaks. In a significant departure from the 2004 draft,43 the IHR also under-
mined the WHO’s very basic function of providing information to facilitate coordination.
The WHO now has to consult with a source state before exercising its powers,44 and its free-
dom to obtain independent information from sources other than the affected state govern-
ment is severely limited.45 Furthermore, the WHO may share such information with other
states only after the source state refuses to collaborate and only “when justified by the mag-
nitude of the public health risk.”46 Crucially, theWHOhas a legal duty to reveal to the source
Klabbers,The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International Organizations Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2015);
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014).
39 FIDLER, supra note 36, at 142.
40 Adam Kamradt-Scott, The International Health Regulations (2005): Strengthening Their Effective
Implementation and Utilisation, 16 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 242, 255–56 (2019). For a legal analysis of the IHR,
see J. Benton Heath, Pandemics and Other Health Emergencies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND GLOBAL SECURITY (forthcoming 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract¼3574149. For generally sup-
portive assessments of the IHR, see David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health
Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J. L., MEDICINE & ETH. 85,
86 (2006) (referring to the IHR as “radically depart[ing] from the traditional approach . . . transform[ing] the
international legal context in which states will exercise their public health sovereignty in the future . . .”). See
also Stefania Negri, Communicable Disease Control, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 273–78
(Gian Luca Burci & Brigit Toebes eds., 2018) (“landmark innovative instrument”).
41 CHRISTIAN KREUDER-SONNEN, EMERGENCY POWERS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 162 (2019).
42 Kamradt-Scott supra note 38, at 806.
43 WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health Regulations,
IGWG/IHR/Working Paper/12.2003 (Jan. 12, 2004), available at https://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/IGWG_IHR_WP12_03-en.pdf (see also two subsequent meetings including summary reports of
the regional consultations, at http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e). The verbatim records of the regional meetings and
plenary sessions remain classified. KREUDER-SONNEN, supra note 41, at 164.
44 International Health Regulations, Art. 12, May 23, 2005, 2509 UNTS 79 [hereinafter IHR] (the director
general must consult with the Emergency Committee and with the source state before declaring emergency). For
criticisms of the composition of the Emergency Committee, see Heath supra note 40, at 14–17.
45 IHR, supra note 44, Art. 9 (theWHO “may take into account reports from sources other than notifications or
consultations [with the source state]” and “then communicate [such] information on the event to the [source]
state”; “[b]efore taking any action based on such reports, [to] consult with and attempt to obtain verification
from the State Party in whose territory the event is allegedly occurring”).
46 Id. Art. 10; see also Art. 11.
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state any independent sources of information (unless “it is duly justified” in maintaining their
confidentiality). This requirement naturally has a chilling effect on the potential contribution
of whistleblowers.47
Moreover, the IHR limit the WHO’s authority to issue travel advisories. The need to rely
on Emergency Committees in response to outbreaks has turned into an invitation for polit-
ical48 and economic interests49 to intervene in expert decision making. Yet, the IHR do not
fetter the discretion of states to adopt whatever trade-restricting measures they deem fit.50
This is reflected in Article 43 of the Regulations, which allows states parties to
implement[] health measures in accordance with their relevant national law and obliga-
tions under international law, in response to specific public health risks or public health
emergencies of international concern, which: (a) achieve the same or greater level of health
protection thanWHO recommends; or . . . are otherwise prohibited under [specific IHR
provisions], provided such measures are otherwise consistent with these Regulations.51
The Article requires that those measures shall not be more restrictive, invasive, or intrusive
“than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health pro-
tection.”52 But the WHO has no weight with which to sanction states taking such measures.
Its only authority is to “request that the State Party concerned reconsider the application of
the measures,” if and when it complies with the duty to report such measures.53
In other words, the IHR both restricted the WHO’s coordination function by limiting
information and also undermined its cooperation-ensuring function by constraining the free-
dom of WHO leadership to act promptly vis-à-vis states’ noncooperative behavior. The con-
sequences of the IHR were laid bare in all subsequent pandemics. Two searching review
processes set up by the WHO noted the institutional limitations. The IHR Review
Committee established in the wake of the Swine Flu pandemic noted that “[t]he most impor-
tant structural shortcoming of the IHR is the lack of enforceable sanctions,”54 and recom-
mended (only) that the WHO try to shame states that adopt excessive measures.55 While
the 2015 Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel56 was ambitious, offering a univer-
salist vision of “shared sovereignty” for interpreting the IHR as a vehicle for “international
47 Id. Art. 9.
48 According to IHR Article 48, a representative of the affected state must be involved.
49 Abigail C. Deshman, Horizontal Review Between International Organizations: Why, How, and Who Cares
About Corporate Regulatory Capture, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1089 (2011).
50 As Zacher and Keefe (supra note 34, at 69–70) rightly point out, the IHR “gave countries significant leeway
in adopting more stringent measures. All that was required of states was that they discuss the more stringent mea-
sures that they intended to implement with WHO officials. In other words, states’ sovereign rights of legislation
have won out in the debate over excessive measures.”
51 IHR, supra note 44, Art. 43.
52 Id., sec. 4
53 Id.
54WHO, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, para. 24, WHO Doc. A64/10 (May 5, 2011).
55 Id.
56 WHO, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (July 2015), at https://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/ebola/report-by-panel.pdf?ua¼1.
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collective action and effective and efficient governance of the global health system,”57 the final
Report of the Review Committee stopped short of suggesting reform.58
IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis suggests that criticisms leveled at the WHO since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic are fundamentally misguided. Undoubtedly, the organization failed to lead the
world to “attain[] . . . the highest possible level of health.”59 But the failure lies with the mem-
ber states who designed it. They created a body that is not equipped for the challenges it faces.
International relations theorists assume that IOs are rationally designed to fit specific pur-
poses.60 The discrepancy between the stated goals of the WHO and its design—whose
flaws were built into the original (1948) concept and were later compounded in the adoption
of the IHR (2005)—could either suggest that the assumption about rationality is misguided
or that the WHO’s designers tolerated the likelihood that it would fall short of its stated
objective.
Thus far, member states have shown no political will to refit theWHO tomeet its complex
task of securing interstate cooperation. Will the various failures at the international and
national levels to cope with the recent pandemic bring states closer to recognizing that the
adoption of the concept of “shared sovereignty” is in their own long-term interests?
57 Id. at 1, para. 9.
58 WHO, Report of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the
Ebola Outbreak and Response, WHO Doc. A69/21 (May 13, 2016).
59 WHO Constitution, supra note 21, Art.1.
60 Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 13, at 762.
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